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Peter J. McCormick*

Sharing the Spotlight: Co-authored
Reasons on the Modern Supreme
Court of Canada

When the Supreme Court of Canada delivers its reasons for judgment, the normal
expectation (the rare "By the Court" decision aside) is that the judgment of the
Court-unanimous or majority or even plurality-will be designated as having
been delivered by one specific judge. ("The reasons of A, B, C and D were
delivered by B.") But in recent decades, the practice has developed for two or
more judges to share this formal designation; co-authorships currently account for
one judgment (and, for that matter one set of minority reasons) in every ten. This
article explores this practice, unusual among comparable national high courts:
when it started, which judges and which combinations of judges have been the
most frequent participants, and what sorts of cases (type of law, size of panel,
length of reasons) have tended to be involved; and it concludes by considering
why this matters, and what it tells us about the evolving Court.
Lorsque la Cour suprdme du Canada exprime les motifs dun arr&t, on s'attend
normalement (saut dans les rares arrits rddig6s au nom de la Cour) &lire que
l'opinion-unanime, majoritaire ou m6me divis6e-a 6t6 rddigde par 'un des
juges. (< Motifs de jugement: Le juge A (avec l'accord des juges B, C et D.) -)
Mais au cours des dernidres d~cennies, il est devenu frequent que deux juges
rddigent les arr6ts; actuellement, un arr6t sur dix est redig6 par plus d'un juge,
tout comme d'ailleurs les motifs de la minorit6. Cet article examine cette pratique,
laquelle est inhabituelle dans les hauts tribunaux comparables : quels juges et
quels groupes de juges ont le plus souvent eu recours 6 ce moyen lorsque la
pratique a 6td instaur~e et dans quels types d'affaires (domaine de droit, nombre
de juges qui si6geaient, longueur du texte des motifs). En conclusion, 'article
demande pourquoi cette fagon de faire est importante et ce qu'elle nous apprend
sur l'dvolution de la Cour
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Introduction
Consider the fairly recent (2003) Supreme Court decision in DoucetBoudreauv. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education).'
This case will be familiar to everyone who has been following the
Supreme Court's Charter jurisprudence. It involves a decision by a
trial judge, dissatisfied with a provincial government's actions regarding
minority language education facilities, who concluded by requiring the
government to report to him regularly concerning the steps they were
taking to deal with the problem. Reversed on this remedy by the provincial
Court of Appeal, the decision was further appealed to the Supreme Court
of Canada which, in a narrow 5-4 judgment, re-established the trial court
decision and remedy. This is an important decision in that it endorses a
novel remedy to a Charter violation, and interesting again for both the
major split on the Court and the vehemence with which both groups
pressed their views.
But my interest is in another aspect of the decision. The decision was a
5-4 split, but if you look at the reasons for the majority, they are introduced
as follows: "The judgment of McLachlin C.J., and Gonthier, lacobucci,
Bastarache and Arbour JJ. was delivered by lacobucci and Arbour JJ."
Similarly, if you look at the reasons of the four judge dissenting group,
they are similarly introduced: "The reasons of Major, Binnie, LeBel and
Deschamps JJ. were delivered by Lebel and Deschamps JJ. (dissenting)."
Normal practice on our own and most comparable common law high
courts would have led us to expect a single judge being indicated as the
lead author of the reasons (which is not to deny, of course, that the reasons
are circulated and suggestions for changes and refinements are received
and often honoured within the reason-signing bloc). Given a single author,
we might ask "why that judge rather than one of the others?" and pursue
this question down a number of possible tracks (seniority; ideological
congruency with the senior justice in the bloc; expertise) within the general
frame 'they take turns.' But: why two and not some other number? And
why those two and not any of the others? It would be novel in the extreme
to suggest a pattern of 'pairs of judges taking turns' or even of a pair being
assigned to write by (presumably) the Chief Justice at judicial confelrence.
These questions (why two? and why these two?) seem on the face of it
rather harder to answer.

1.
Doucet-Boudreauv Nova Scotia (MinisterofEducation), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 SCR 3 [DoucetBoudreau].
2.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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Is this an extreme and unusual example? Far from it. Consider Chaoulli
v Quebec,' the extraordinary 2005 decision that struck down Quebec's
ban on private health care insurance. Three judges on a seven-judge panel
found that the ban violated the Charter;three judges found that it did not;
and a seventh judge, finding that the ban violated the Quebec Charter4 was
silent on the Canadian Charterissue. But the reasons of the three judges
who found a Canadian Charterviolation were written by two judges, with
the third simply signing on in the type of concurrence we normally take
for granted; the reasons of the three judges who dissented were likewise
written by two of the judges, again with the third simply signing on.
My argument will be that co-authorship of this sort is a fairly recent
development on the modern Supreme Court of Canada, that we can identify
a 'who' and a 'when' for its beginning, that it has been increasing to a level
and in a way that makes it a more routine part of the current Court than of
any prior Court, and that there are implications to the emergence of this
practice that we need to consider in terms of the role of individual judges
within the Court. But first I want to head off possible objections to tasking
your time with the question at all.
Let me anticipate scepticism. Say "co-authorships," and many will
reply: first of all, it cannot be all that new because the Dickson Court' gave
us Irwin Toy Ltd v. Quebec (Attorney General)6 and Sparrow,' still two of
the prime examples from whatever co-authorship short list one might wish
to develop; that was 25 years ago, so whatever it is, it is not particularly
new. Second, because other more recent examples do not leap to mind,
it cannot be all that frequent. And third, even if there is somewhat more
history and substance to it than that, the prime example is surely the Coryand-lacobucci partnership through the 1990s, which was not that frequent
(only a dozen instances), and in any event, involves two judges who left
the Court years ago. This aside, one might say, nothing really seems to
stand out, so this is at most just a low-grade thing that perhaps (Cory and
lacobucci aside) reflects nothing more than idiosyncratic circumstances.
Table 1 below is my response to all three objections.

3.
4.
5.
1984
6.
7.

Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791 [Chaoulli].
Charterof Human Rights and Freedoms, RSQ, c C-12.
Former Chief Justice Dickson was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada from 18 April
until his retirement on 30 June 1990.
Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 [Irwin Toy].
Rv Sparrow, [1990] I SCR 1075 [Sparrow].
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Judgments

Minority
Reasons

All Reasons

Cases with
Co-Authored
Reasons

Dickson Court

4 (0.7%)

2 (0.5%)

6 (0.6%)

6 (1.1%)

Lamer Court

26 (4.0%)

20 (3.2%)

46 (3.6%)

45 (6.9%)

McLachlin Court

68(9.8%)

31(8.3%)

99(9.3%)

91 (13.1%)

Total Period

98 (5.2%)

53 (3.8%)

151 (4.6%)

142 (7.5%)

Court

Table 1: Co-authored Reasons (as % of all such reasons)

How rare is the practice? For the Dickson Court, it was vanishingly
rare; the two obvious examples I gave above are half of the six-year total
for judgments, and one-third of all the co-authored sets of reasons of all
kinds. For the Lamer Court,' it was about six times as frequent but (Cory
and lacobucci JJ. notwithstanding) still a relatively minor phenomenon.
But the McLachlin Court9 now deploys co-authored judgments in a solid
one-tenth of all its cases, and co-authored reasons in fully one eleventh of
all sets of reasons of all kinds. Perhaps a better measure is the percentage
of reserved decisions that include at least one set of co-authored reasons,
judgment or minority; this has tracked upward from one per cent for the
Dickson Court, through seven per cent for the Lamer Court, to 13 per cent
(more than one in eight) for the McLachlin Court. This is a clear upward
trajectory, all the more so when we penetrate the almost-a-decade block
of the Lamer Court to find a solid 'before and after' split, as I will do in
a later section. Second, the Cory/lacobucci JJ. partnership does not loom
particularly large within the practice because the most active use of coauthorships has occurred under McLachlin C.J., when Cory J. had already
left the Court, and it still continues (and continues to grow) in recent years
after Justice lacobucci's departure. Indeed, as it turns out, there is another
pairing on the Court in this last decade that rivals the Cory/Iacobucci JJ.
partnership for the absolute number of its co-authorships. Finally, the
count of co-authored reasons has now reached quite impressive levelsover the last 25 years, there have been 150 of them, two thirds of them
judgments. And my examples already make the point that they are not
confined to the more routine cases: Irwin Toy and Sparrow from the 1980s,

8.
Former Chief Justice Lamer was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from I July 1990 until his
retirement on 6 January 2000.
9.
Chief Justice McLachlin was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on 7 January 2000
and is still Chief Justice at time of writing.
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and Doucet-Boudreau and Chaoulli from the more recent decade, make
the point that these cases include some of the Court's most important and
high profile decisions.
It would be too much to suggest that co-authorship is taking over as
the dominant form; the numbers are too modest for this. But the practice
is sufficiently frequent, and sufficiently persistent over a long enough time
period, to suggest that we cannot simply ignore it, and that we need to take
a closer look at the who and the what and the when and the why; this is
what I shall do in this paper.
I. How?
As the table above suggests, I will explore the co-authorship question in
the context of a database that includes all decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada between 18 April 1984 (Dickson J.'s appointment as Chief
Justice) and 31 December 2010-a span of just under 27 years including
two complete Chief Justiceships and the first eleven years of a third. The
cases were accessed on the LEXUM website, 0 and coded for a range of
elements and variables.
For present purposes, the data set has been reduced from the total
that this description would imply. First, I include only panel decisions on
appeals or direct references to the Court; this might seem self-evident, but
from time to time the Court includes, and incorporates into the new (post
2000) neutral numbering system, products of the Court that are not panel
decisions. For example, they can sometimes include motions decided by a
single judge," or decisions by a three-judge panel for various applications.12
Second, I include only those panel decisions where judgment was reserved
for written reasons, excluding the hundreds of oral decisions given from
the bench on the same day as oral arguments; these were particularly
numerous during the Lamer C.J. decade.
Within this data-set, I have singled out co-authored sets of reasonsthat is to say, not only co-authored judgments for the Court, but also
co-authored minority reasons. Within the text of the reasons, these take
the form of "The judgment (or the reasons) of (several members of the
panel, or of The Court) were delivered by (more than one justice)." The
overwhelming majority of these co-authorships involve two judges, but
10. http://scc.lexum.umontreal.calen/index.html.
I. RvReddick, [1991] I SCR 1105;Norbergv Wynrib, [1992]2 SCR 224; M(K) vM(H), [1992] 3
SCR 3; Quebec v Montreal, [1999] I SCR 38 1; Public School Boards'Association ofAlberta v Alberta
2000 SCC 2, [2000] 1 SCR 44; Alliance for Marriage and Family v AA, 2007 SCC 40, [2007] 3 SCR
124.
12. Rv Roberge, 2005 SCC 48, [200512 SCR 469; Rv Hay, 2010 SCC 54; Rv White, 2010 SCC 59,
[2010] 3 SCR 374.
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there are a smaller number of cases where three judges were involved
(as in Irwin Toy), and a single dissent that was co-authored jointly by all
four of the dissenting judges; this slightly complicates the counting that is
involved in some tables below, but not to such an extent as to compromise
any calculations.
II. What?
Common law courts, including common law appeal courts (and especially
including common law national high courts) do not simply declare
outcomes; they also give reasons that explain why that outcome is the most
appropriate one." Indeed, the reasons (which provide guidance for lower
courts and send signals to potential litigants) are arguably considerably
more important than the outcome (which usually matters only to the
immediate parties); reasons, not outcomes, are the court's primary product.
Courts are, in the familiar language of the Federalist Papers, the weakest
of the three branches of government. They lack a police force to enforce
their rulings, or even a bureaucracy to follow up on whether their orders
have been obeyed, relying instead on the parties coming back to court if
the consequences have not been satisfactory. 'Giving reasons' is the most
important thing that courts do, which is why it is a mistake to focus too
narrowly on who wins, or how the judges voted.
However, practices vary considerably from one country to another.
Elsewhere I have explored the emergence of a unique format for decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada, accompanied by the emergence of a
unique protocol for minority reasons; 4 in that paper, I briefly canvassed
the diversity of decision-delivery formats in the common law world. The
same observations apply to the specific element of how authorship of those
reasons is presented. The British House of Lords (that was), and United
Kingdom Supreme Court that has replaced it, tend toward seriatim" or at
least plural judgments, with several and sometimes all the members of the
panel writing full sets of reasons with very little cross-referencing or selflocation and with a considerable tolerance for repetition and overlap. The
13.
See Martin Shapiro, "The Giving Reasons Requirement" (1992) U Chicago Legal F 179; and
Frederick Schauer, "Giving Reasons" (1995) 48 Stan L Rev, 633. Looking wider than common law
courts, see Mathilde Cohen, "Reason Giving in Court Practice: Decision-makers at the Crossroads"
(2008) 14 Colum JEurL 77; and Vlad Perju "Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice"
(2009) 49 Va JInt IL 307.
14. Peter McCormick, "Structures of Judgment: How the Supreme Court of Canada Organizes Its
Reasons" (2009) 32 Dal LJ 35.
15. That is to say: everyone writes their own separate and free-standing reasons, with their "votes"
being tabulated to generate an outcome and to mark some of those reasons as dissents, but with the
specific reasoning directing that outcome being developed retrospectively by judges in subsequent
decisions.
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Australian High Court oscillates between seriatim decisions, especially
for constitutional cases,16 and decisions that are ostensibly equally coauthored by all the members of the majority (or of the entire panel in
the case of unanimity), with no identification of a lead author. The US
Supreme Court follows a practice of single authorship so persistently that
one can observe and analyze the practices of opinion assignment within
the majority block" and to some extent within the minority block as
well' 8 (although US Supreme Court practices are unusual for the fact that
decisions are divided into "parts" and the various members of the panel
can sign onto, or differ from, each of those parts so as to create complex,
even byzantine patterns 9 ).
In general terms, during the 20th century the Supreme Court of Canada
evolved from frequent seriatimdecisions, to frequently divided panels, to
increasingly unified decisions with a lead author; 20 by the closing years
of the Laskin Court, the Court was delivering a higher proportion of
unanimous decisions than ever before in its history. But the period that
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. is describing consistently involves sets of reasons that
are attributed to a single judge, usually with one or more other judges
signing on to the reasons, or limiting themselves to curt single sentence
concurrences; what is changing over the period is the number of such
sets of reasons that typically accompany a single decision of the Court
and (concomitantly) the number of signatures that are typically attached
to one of those sets of reasons. What has emerged since the end of the
Laskin Court, and especially since the closing years of the Lamer Court, is
a practice of co-authored reasons; that is of two (only rarely more) judges
jointly sharing the designation of lead author. This is a new development
16. See Matthew Groves & Russell Smyth, "A Century of Judicial Style: Changing Patterns in
Judgment Writing on the High Court 1903-2001" (2004) 32 Federal L Rev 255. See also Matthew
Lynch, "Report from Australia" The Court (24 April 2007), online: The Court <http://www.thecourt.
ca/2007/04/24/report-from-Australia>, who observes that "the High Court of Australia has always
stated its decisions in seriatim."
17. See e.g. Forrest Maltzman & Paul J Wahlbeck, "A Conditional Model of Opinion Assignment on
the Supreme Court" (2004) 57 Political Research Q 551; Jeffrey Lax & Charles Cameron, "Bargaining
and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court" (2007) 23 JL, Economics & Organization 276;
and Paul J Wahlbeck, "Strategy and Constraints in Supreme Court Opinion Assignments" (2006) 154
U Pa L Rev 1729.
18. See Beverly Blair Cook, "Justice Brennan and the institutionalization of dissent assignment"
(1995) 79 Judicature 17; reprinted in Elliot E Slotnick (ed) JudicialPolitics:Readingsfrom Judicature
(American Judicature Society, 1999) at 363.
19. B Rudolph Delson, "Typography in the U.S. Reports and Supreme Court Voting Protocols"
(2001) 76:4 NYUL Rev 1293.
20. For a discussion of the (declining) practice of seriatim judgments on the Supreme Court of
Canada, see Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, "The Length and Plurality of Supreme Court of Canada
Decisions" (1990) 28 Alb L Rev 551. The last pure seriatim decision by the Supreme Court of Canada
was Hossack v Hertz Drive Yourself Stations of Ontario Ltd, [1966] SCR 28.
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for the Supreme Court of Canada; it has no counterpart in the high courts
of England or the United States; and it is only remotely similar to the
practices of the High Court of Australia. This is both new and distinctive;
in the following sections I will describe its general characteristics.
III. When?
Table 1 above suggests a practice that was rare on the Dickson Court and
considerably more frequent on the McLachlin Court, with the Lamer Court
falling somewhere in between. What remains to be seen is whether this is
really a step-wise increase (three separate Courts performing consistently
at three different levels), a steady gradual rise, or a discontinuous
development somewhere within the middle segment. Figure 1 provides
the answer.
16
---

1412

..............

10
8

.Minority

Jfudgments

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Figure 1: Frequency of Co-authorship (absolute count)

Figure 1 suggests not gradual growth but rather a sharp jump. After a
decade where the number of co-authored reasons fluctuates between zero
and three, evenly divided between decisions and minorities, it jumps to
nine in 1995, as many as the five previous years combined. It briefly drops
in the following year to the more 'normal' level of three, but then rises in
1997, and rises again to a new high in 1998. The following dozen years
continue at this new high level (save for the curiosity of calendar 2000).
The average level for 1998 through 2010 is fractionally above the 'spike'
in 1995, which suggests that this represents the pivotal year when coauthorship arrived as a significant element in the Court's decision-delivery
performance.
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Figure 2: Frequency of Co-authorship (as %)

The absolute number is not, of course, the whole story, because the total
caseload of the Court has been fluctuating over the quarter century. A good
part of this fluctuation is the product of the oral from-the-bench decisions,
which made up more than 20 per cent of the Lamer Court caseload but
only half that share for the McLachlin Court, yet there has still been a
downward drift of the caseload in the past dozen years. The possibility
that the numbers in Figure I might be in some part an artefact of these
fluctuations is belied by this single basic observation-the absolute count
of co-authorships has been going up while the annual number of reserved
judgments has been going down. Figure 2 explores this question more
directly. The two lines indicate the number of shared reasons (judgment
and minority) as a percentage of all such reasons; so as to soften the spikes
and curves and allow a general trend-line to emerge, these represent
three-year running totals. The upward trend in the relative frequency of
both co-authored judgments and co-authored minority reasons is strongly
confirmed, as is the general picture of an upward shift to a new and higher
plateau somewhere around 1995. For most of this period, the frequency
for co-authored decisions runs well above that of co-authored minority
reasons; only recently have they converged.
The lines in recent years are fluctuating enough to make forward
projection rather difficult. It would appear that co-authorship of reasons
may have peaked at the beginning of the McLachlin Court, and is perhaps
trending lower; but the co-authorship of minority reasons, which sagged at
that same time, has shown a precisely off-setting increase. I have omitted
the possible third line from the graph, for co-authored reasons of all kinds
as a percentage of the total; the running three-year averages for this figure
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have been higher for every year since 2002 than they were for every year
before 2002. The appearance of a slight dip in calendar 2009 is offset by
higher numbers in 2010, the highest single year percentage figure ever
(and the second highest absolute number ever). It is less likely that the
patterns in Figures 1 and 2 show a passing and self-correcting trend than
that they represent a new 'plateau' of co-authorship performance. Coauthorship is not a passing fad; it has instead become a settled part of the
Court's decision-delivery repertoire.

IV Who?
Given that co-authorships have at least recently become quite significant,
the obvious question is: are some judges contributing disproportionately
to this development and, if so, which ones? I will consider each of the
three Chief Justiceships in turn.
1. The Dickson Court
The number of co-authored reasons on the Dickson Court was small enough
that they can simply be listed, along with the participating judges in each
case. There were four co-authored judgments, two with two authors and
two with three; there was also a two-authored dissent, and a two-authored
concurrence. To describe this as 'one per year' is not simply to give an
average (six co-authorships in six years), but very nearly to describe the
actual frequency; they are very close to being spaced out such that there is
a single example in each calendar year, the more so given that John v R.
was handed down in December.
Case

Citation

Type

Co-Authors

Germain v R.

[19851 2 SCR 241

concurrence

Dickson & Lamer JJ.

John v R.

[1985] 2 SCR 476

judgment

Estey & Lamer JJ.

Labrosse v R.

[1987] 1 SCR 310

judgment

McIntyre, Lamer & La Forest JJ.

R. v Green

[1988] 1 SCR 228

dissent

Estey & Lamer JJ.

Irwin Toy

[1989] 1 SCR 927

judgment

Dickson, Lamer & Wilson JJ.

R. v Sparrow

[1990] 1 SCR 1075

judgment

Dickson & La Forest JJ.

Table 2: Co-authored Reasons, Dickson Court

The name that stands out from the string of co-author pairs and triplets
is Lamer J., who is involved in all but one of the six co-authorships; Dickson
C.J. is second, with three. In all, six judges share the fourteen slots-this
out of the total count of fourteen judges who served on the Court for at
least part of the six years. One feature that might help explain these co-
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authorships is the fact that for four of the cases (all but Sparrow and John),
the co-authoring judges represent all the judges in the group (that is to say:
"the reasons ofjustices A and B were delivered by JUSTICES AAND B");
there were no other judges signing on to the reasons. That said it was far
from common for a pair or trio of judges joining on a set of reasons to do
so through co-authorship; the norm was very much for one to write and
the other(s) to sign.
2. The Lamer Court
There were considerably more co-authored reasons by the judges of
the Lamer Court, such that it is useful to organize the record of their
participation into tabular form, which is done in Table 3. This indicates all
the co-authored reasons (judgments, dissents and separate concurrences)
in which each judge participated. The rank ordering is driven by the
number of co-authored reasons per year of service on the Lamer Court,
although strictly speaking this is less useful a number than it might have
been because co-authorship is so much more part of the second half of the
decade than it is of the first.
Reasons
Co-Authored

Years
Served

Co-Authored
per year

Co-Authored
With

Bastarache

7

2.3

3.1

5

lacobucci

27

9.0

3.0

6

Cory

18

8.9

2.0

7

Sopinka

10

7.4

1.3

5

McLachlin

11

9.5

1.1

8

Major

8

7.2

1.1

4

Lamer C.J.

8

9.5

0.8

7

Binnie

1

2.0

0.5

1

LaForest

3

7.2

0.4

3

L'HeureuxDub6

2

9.5

0.2

2

Judge

Table 3: Participation in Co-Authorship by Judge, Lamer Court

The two judges who stand out in Table 3 are lacobucci and Cory JJ.
Together, they account for fully one-half of the co-authorship activities
2
of the Lamer Court (and lacobucci J. himself accounts for a third). 1
Bastarache J. leads the table because his seven sets of co-authored reasons
21. On the other hand: even together, they are only one half of the total, so it is over-reaching to
say that they invented the practice, or that co-authorship is little more than the story of their unusual
partnership.

Sharing the Spotlight

177

in two and a quarter years put him marginally ahead of lacobucci J.; it is of
course worth noting that Justice Bastarache's two plus years were all after
the critical shift of the 1995 calendar year, where there was considerably
more co-authorship going on to be part of, but Binnie J. served for almost
as long with only a single co-authorship to show for it, which suggests
that Justice Bastarache's high ranking on the table is still carrying some
information.
If the list of judges in Table 3 appears somewhat short, this is
because I have omitted the four judges who served on the Lamer Court
but never co-authored a single set of reasons. In the case of Wilson J.,
this is understandable; she served for less than six months before retiring.
Stevenson J. served for just under two years, still a relative short period;
and Arbour J. was appointed less than three months before Lamer C.J.
retired. But the most striking of the non-participants in co-authorship
is Gonthier J., who served the full nine and a half years of the Lamer
decade without co-authoring a single set of reasons with anybody. Table
3 suggests three judges (lacobucci, Cory and Bastarache JJ.) who were
frequent co-authors, four (Sopinka, McLachlin, Major and Lamer JJ.) who
were occasional co-authors, and the other half of the Court who did so
seldom or never.
LAM WIL LAF L'H SOP COR GON MCL STE IAC MAJ BAS BIN
LAM

2

1

1

-

1

1

1

-

WIL

-

LAF
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2

2

1

1

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

I

SOP

2

1

-

1

1

5
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I

I

1

-

3

12

1

1

I

I

1

3

-

1

3

3

X

X
3

X

GON
MCL

1

STE

-

IAC

2

X

MAJ

2

X

BAS

I

X

X

BIN

I

X

X

ARB

X

5

X

1

12

1

-

4

1

3

X

4

-

1

3

X

3

X
X

X

X

-

X
X

X

Table 4: Co-authorship Pairings, Lamer Court"
22. Totals may differ from Table 3 because of the small number of triple-authored reasons which
throws off the count.
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But Table 3 (which judges participated in how many co-authorships)
is only half of the story; the other half is who they co-authored with, and
this is shown in Table 4. lacobucci J. clearly dominates the table: the three
highest counts for co-authorships (12, 5, and 4) all link him with one of his
colleagues, Cory and Sopinka and Major JJ. respectively. The Cory-andlacobucci partnership is clearly the highlight of the interactions indicated
on Table 4, the more so because it includes no fewer than six decisions
of the Court (Vrienc2 3 and M v. H.2 4 are perhaps the most instantly
recognizable).
If lacobucci J. is in some sense 'first' in Tables 3 and 4, being the most
frequent and most effective user of the co-authorship style, then at first
glance Cory J. would seem to be second, but I think there is a better way
of looking it. Cory J.'s prominence on the tables is only the reflection of
lacobucci J.; take all of Justice lacobucci's numbers off the table, and the
person who stands out is not Cory J. but rather McLachlin J., who not only
has the third highest absolute count but has also co-authored with more of
her colleagues (eight) than any other member of the Court.
The logic I am suggesting here is similar to that followed by Edelman
and Chen in their well known studies of the "most dangerous" justice on
the US Supreme Court,2 5 which for them is a matter of flexibility, in the
sense of an openness to the maximum number of alliances. Their measure
of power is to set aside the question of how many times a particular set of
judges may have prevailed, and ask instead how many prevailing-at-leastonce combinations a particular judge has taken part in-this indicates the
judge's capacity to form diverse alliances, a capacity that can be "cashed
in" to deliver unexpected majorities. On the parallel logic, McLachlin J.
has indicated that she is more able than anyone else on the Court to form
joint delivery partnerships with the full range of her colleagues; besides
the 'never co-author' trio of Wilson, Stevenson and Gonthier JJ., the only
person outside her net is the 'almost never co-author' Binnie J. To adopt
Edelman and Chen's deliberately provocative language, this arguably
makes McLachlin J. the "most dangerous justice" on the Lamer Court.

23.
riendv Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 [Vriendj.
24. Mv H, [1999] 2 SCR 3. These two co-authorships are unusual because they consist of a first
section attributed to Cory J and a second section attributed to lacobucci J; no other set of co-authored
reasons takes this form.
25. Paul Edelman & Jim Chen, "The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Mathematics" (1996) 70 S Cal L Rev 63; Paul Edelman & Jim Chen, "The Most Dangerous Justice
Rides Again: Revisiting the Power Pageant of the Justices" (2001) 86 Minn L Rev 131; Paul Edelman
& Jim Chen, "The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Into the Sunset" (2007) 24 Const Commentary 199.
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3. The McLachlin Court
Table 5 is the counterpart of Table 3, showing for each judge how often
they took part in co-authored reasons and then running this against the
length of their service on the McLachlin Court. The 'co-authorships per
year' column, and therefore the sorting in order of this measure, is much
more meaningful for the McLachlin Court, since co-authorships and the
opportunity to take part in them have been consistently high through the
whole decade.
There are two obvious differences between Table 5 and earlier Table
3. The first is that the numbers in Table 5 are much bigger, with twice
as many judges into double figures and two (compared with zero) taking
part in thirty or more jointly authored reasons. The second is that there
are no zeroes; that is to say, unlike the situation for the Lamer Court,
where four judges (including one who served the whole decade) never
co-authored a single set of reasons, not one of the fifteen judges who has
served on the McLachlin Court has similarly declined to participate in
a single co-authorship. Even the shortest serving members (L'HeureuxDub6 J. with two and a half years at the beginning, Cromwell J. with just
over two years at the end) have co-authored; and even Gonthier J. has five
such partnerships in three and a half years, up from zero in the previous
decade, although this still places him toward the bottom of the table. Only
three Lamer Court judges averaged two co-authorships per year; seven
McLachlin Court judges do so. Co-authorships are clearly more frequent
and more pervasive.
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Reasons
Co-Authored

Years
Served

Co-Authored
per year

Co-Authored
With

lacobucci

22

4.5

4.9

4

McLachlin C.J.

31

11.0

2.8

11

LeBel

30

11.0

2.7

8

Bastarache

21

8.5

2.5

9

Judge

Fish

18

7.4

2.4

6

Major

14

6.0

2.3

5

Arbour

10

4.5

2.2

2

L'Heureux-Dub6

4

2.5

1.6

4

Abella

10

6.3

1.6

5

Deschamps

13

8.4

1.5

7

Rothstein

7

4.8

1.4

6

Gonthier

5

3.6

1.4

4

Charron

7

6.3

1.1

3

Binnie

7

11.0

0.6

4

Cromwell

1

2.0

0.5

1

Table 5: Participation in Co-authorship by Judge, McLachlin Court

lacobucci J. continues to stand out among thejudges for his willingness
to co-author; although he served less than half of the McLachlin decade,
he still places third among the judges for the absolute frequency of his coauthorships, and is well out in first place on a 'per year' basis-somewhat
surprisingly, perhaps, given that his 'partner of preference' Cory left the
Court in 1999. McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache J. are also fairly high on the
table, as is LeBel J. (who replaced Lamer in 2000) and Fish J. (appointed in
2003). All of the judges whose service carries over from the Lamer Court
are co-authoring more frequently under McLachlin C.J.-even Gonthier
J., who never did so under Lamer C.J.-with the notable exception of
Binnie J. who continues to rank very close to the bottom of the table. Even
Cromwell J., the most recent appointee, has already co-authored once
(with, as it happens, Rothstein J., the second most recent appointee). On
the one hand, it is therefore clear that co-authorship has become pervasive
on the Court but, on the other hand, there is a clear spread in the extent to
which various members of the Court take part in it.
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5
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1

5
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1
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1
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1
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1
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X
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1
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1

1
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3

9

-

9
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1

1

Table 6: Co-Authorship Pairings, McLachlin Court

The frequency ofspecific pairings is indicated in Table 6 (the counterpart
to Table 4). Justice lacobucci's numbers continue to be impressive; his
nine co-authorships with Arbour J.,2 6 and seven with Bastarache J., are
among the highest numbers on the table. However, the most numerous
single pairing is that between Fish and LeBel JJ., with ten co-authorships
including five decisions of the Court.27 And McLachlin C.J. once again
displays the 'flexible power' of having not only co-authored more times
than anyone else on the Court, but also having done so with a wider variety
of co-authorship partners.
V. Who not?
The previous section has dealt with which pairs of judges have ever coauthored reasons, and how often they have done so; but there is another
side to the story. In Table 4, there are theoretically 91 different pairs of
judges, but 15 of these are indicated with an X because they represent
pairs of judges whose service on the Court did not overlap. This leaves
76 possible pairs of judges, but only 24 of these cells have any numbers
in them; the other 52 are blank (which is why I did not obscure this point
26. Although five of these are accounted for by the case of R v Johnson, 2003 SCC 46, [2003] 2 SCR
357 [Johnson], and the four (very) much shorter companion case decisions that accompany it.
27. The most significant probably being Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008
SCC 38, [2008] 2 SCR 326.

X

182 The Dalhousie Law Journal
by putting "0's" in those cells). Although there was a certain degree of coauthorship on the Lamer Court, only 31.6 per cent (less than a third) of the
possible pairings were actualized in practice. Similarly, on the McLachlin
Court there are theoretically 105 possible pairs of judges, but 22 of these
are indicated with an X because these are pairs ofjudges whose service did
not overlap. This leaves 83 possible pairs of judges, but only 39 of them
were active; only 47.0 per cent (less than half) of the possible pairings
were actualized. On both Courts, there were more pairs of judges who
never co-authored than who did so.
Some of these pairings involve judges whose service on the Court
in question was very short: Wilson, Stevenson, Arbour JJ. (on the Lamer
Court), L'Heureux-Dub6 J., and Cromwell J. (on the McLachlin Court).
These arguably did not have time to experience the full range of interactions
that would have given full scope for co-authorships. Some represent those
judges-most notably, Gonthier J. on the Lamer Court-who served for
an extended period but never co-authored with anybody.
But there are other non-active pairings that are interesting. Abella and
Charron JJ. were both appointed on the same day, midway through the
McLachlin Chief Justiceship, after serving together on the Ontario Court
of Appeal for nine years; and yet they have never co-authored anything,
whether as majority or minority. (Cory and Gonthier JJ. were likewise
appointed on the same day, toward the end of the Dickson Court, but
never co-authored.) Bastarache and Binnie JJ. are the pair ofjudges whose
appointments in the late 1990s ended the 'natural court' that centered
the Lamer decade; both have co-authored a number of sets of reasons
(Bastarache J. considerably more often than Binnie J.), but they have
never co-authored together.
But, saving the best for last: clearly the two most active co-authoring
judges on the Supreme Court in the last twenty years are lacobucci J. and
McLachlin C.J.; whatever advantages accrue to, or whatever challenges
are best met by, co-authorships, they have been the most deeply engaged.
lacobucci J. has been involved in 49 co-authored reasons, McLachlin C.J.
in 42. Put differently: these two judges between them have participated in
well over one half of all the co-authorships that have happened in the last
quarter century. Yet over all these opportunities, and all these years, they
have only once co-authored anything: the judgment in R. v. Mills.28
None of my readers will need any reminding that Mills was a rather
extraordinary case; what I want to stress is how splendidly it is located
within the evolution of the notion of 'dialogue theory' as a way of
28. R v Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668 [Mills].
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understanding the relationship between Court and Parliament-that is to
say, that Parliament is not always limited to doing what the Court says,
but can sometimes talk back.29 The classic Canadian judicial statement on
dialogue theory as the correct understanding of the role of the Court and
its relationship to the legislature is found in Vriend,3 0 and these reasons
were written by lacobucci J.3 ' In Mills, about a year later, a majority of the
Court upheld as constitutional an amendment to the Criminal Code32 that
embodied the ideas of the minority rather than the majority in O'Connor."
It would be hard to find a purer example of Parliament 'talking back'rather
than simply acquiescing, which arguably represents the high point of
dialogue theory. This was the one and only set of reasons ever co-authored
by McLachlin C.J. and lacobucci J. Three years later, the Court effectively
shut the door on dialogue theory in Sauve 2,34 with the majority reasons
being delivered by McLachlin C.J. I find it intriguing that the investigation
of co-authorship leads to McLachlin C.J. and lacobucci J., and that the sole
example of a McLachlin-lacobucci co-authorship leads to this important
mid-point of an evolving notion about constitutional interpretation.15
VI. Where?
By "where?" I mean "in what kinds of cases were co-authored reasons
most likely to be found?". My concern throughout is to counter the
suggestion that although co-authorships were taking place to some extent,
they were limited to the periphery-to simpler, more routine cases without
strong precedential value. For these purposes, I will refrain from dividing
the co-authorship experience among the three Chief Justiceships; I will
instead pick up on the strong intimation from Figures 1 and 2 that we
can identify a specific time period (calendar 1995) when the practice

29. For the genesis of dialogue theory in the context of Canadian constitutional interpretation, see
Peter Hogg & Allison Bushel, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (or, Perhaps
the Charter Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 75, expanded in their
"Reply to 'Six Degrees of Separation"' (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 529.
30. Vriend, supra note 23 at 563.
3 1. More correctly: recall that Vriend is one of only two co-authored decisions (both by Cory and
lacobucci JJ) that take the form of a first section attributed to Cory J and a second section attributed to
lacobucci J; this being the case, we can despite the co-authorship say that the endorsement of dialogue
theory is specifically lacobucci J's.
32. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
33. Rv O'Connor,[1995]4 SCR 411.
34. Sauve v Canada (ChiefElectoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 SCR 519. (Usually referred to
as "Sauve 2" because there was an earlier "Sauve 1" raising similar issues but less conclusively, that
being Sauve v Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 SCR 438).
35. For a more expanded argument on the place of Sauve 2 in the dialogue debate, see Christopher
Manfredi, "The Day the Dialogue Died: A Comment on Sauve v. Canada" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ
105.
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stopped being purely sporadic and occasional and instead became more
frequent and regular. Calendar 1995 saw three times as many co-authored
sets of reasons as any previous year in the modem Supreme Court period,
although it fell just short of breaking into double digits.3 6
1. Type of case
The first independent variable that seems worth considering is the type of
law that was involved in the case. The standard division-still used in the
Supreme Court of Canada's own statistics-is between criminal cases and
civil cases, the two between them exhausting the entire caseload; I find
this unworkably blunt. My own preference is to divide the caseload into
three distinct and easily identifiable categories: criminal law (engaging
the Crown); public law (involving a government department or official
in a non-criminal context); and private law (involving private citizens or
corporate entities). From this exhaustive tripartite set, I then carve out a
fourth category, namely Charter cases (usually criminal cases, but with a
steadily increasing element of public law cases).
Co-Authored
Reasons

No Co-Authored
Reasons

Total

Co-Author%

Charter

47

171

218

21.6%

Public

33

248

281

11.7%

Criminal

26

246

272

9.6%

Private

23

242

265

8.7%

Total

129

907

1036

12.5%

Type of Case

Table 7: Frequency of Co-authorship, by Type of Case

Table 7 shows the frequency of co-authored reasons (that is to say,
either co-authored judgments or co-authored minority reasons) for each of
these four categories, arranged in descending order. Chartercases easily
lead, with double the frequency of non-Chartercases; the other three are
separated by such small margins that it seems best to declare it something
of a tie. Over the last fifteen years, then, one fifth of all Charter cases,
and one-tenth of non-Chartercases, have included co-authored reasons by
either the deciding majority or the differing minority. Given that the high
profile Chartercases continue to provide such an important dimension of
the contemporary Court's jurisprudence, this strongly suggests that the co-

36. Those figures also provide some temptation for treating calendar 1998 as the critical date, with
1995 as a unique departure from the previous lower levels of co-authorship. However, not picking
1995 would leave out cases like Egan v Canada,[1995] 2 SCR 513 and Thibaudeau v Canada,[1995]
2 SCR 627, which under the earlier date stand as marking the pivotal change, and this is attractive.
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authorship phenomenon is not connected with the less important elements
of the Court's caseload.
2. Type of decision
Another way of identifying significant cases is to consider whether or not
the Court has divided on the matter. I fully recognize that the Court makes
a serious attempt to generate a united court and solid reasons on its most
important cases, but the point is that these major cases (controversial,
or with real public or public policy impact, or breaking new ground, or
requiring some change or retreat from prior decisions) require the extra
effort because they are inherently more likely to be divisive. Certainly
the other end of the notional spectrum is less controversial-the more
straightforward cases that do not raise major issues or controversies are
more likely to be unanimous.
Co-Authored
Reasons

No Co-Authored
Reasons

Total

Co-Author%

Unanimous

38

509

547

6.9%

Majority

72

364

436

16.5%

Type of decision

Plurality

19

34

53

35.8%

Total

129

907

1036

12.5%

Table 8: Frequency of Co-authorship, by Type of Decision

Table 8 shows the frequency of co-authorship for the three different
types of Supreme Court decision: unanimous decisions, majority decisions
(which for me includes cases with separate concurrences as well as those
with dissents), and plurality decisions (in which there is no single set of
'outcome plus reasons' that draws the direct support of a majority ofjudges
on the panel). The sharp jump between 'unanimous' and 'majority' opinions
is of course largely illusory: by definition, a unanimous decision only has
one set of reasons that can be co-authored or not; but a majority decision
has (at least) two. Given that comparable proportions of judgments and
minority reasons are co-authored, this must mean that majority decisions
should be twice as likely (actually, a little more than twice as likely, since
some will involve more than two sets of reasons) to include co-authored
reasons, and they are. But the much higher proportions for plurality
reasons do not succumb to such an easy explanation. Assuming (as seems
only reasonable) that the more difficult cases are the ones that generate
more division on the Court, this suggests that the more difficult cases are
more likely to draw co-authored reasons. This again argues against the
suggestion that the co-authorship phenomenon is primarily the product of
the more routine parts of the caseload.
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3. Panelsize
Another measure of importance is the size of the panel to which the case
is assigned. Under Supreme Court practices, a case can be assigned to a
panel of at least five judges; for obvious reasons, the practice is to restrict
this to panels with odd numbers of judges. The modem Supreme Court
(Laskin C.J. and after) has increasingly leaned toward the use of larger
rather than smaller panels, which is facilitated by the somewhat smaller
caseloads of recent years; but the logic has always been that the more
important cases are directed toward the full court of nine judges, and the
less important cases (such as most appeals by right) are directed to five
judge panels.37 The size of the panel is therefore a good indication of
the relative importance that the case had in the expectations of the Chief
Justice, and although this is not a perfect indicator (some nine-judge panels
conclude with oral from-the-bench decisions; some five-judge panels hand
down decisions that are among the Court's most frequently cited), it is a
reasonable first approximation.
Co-Authored
Reasons

No Co-Authored
Reasons

Total

Co-Author%

Nine judges

81

445

526

15.4%

Seven judges

44

389

433

10.2%

Five judges

4

73

77

5.2%

129

907

1036

12.5%

Panel Size

Total

Table 9: Frequency of Co-authorship, by Size ofPanel

Table 9 indicates the frequency of co-authorship by the size of the
panel, and the pattern is obvious. Seven-judge panels are twice as likely,
and nine judge panels three times as likely, as five judge panels to employ
co-authorship. To be sure, this almost suspicious step-wise pattern is
qualified by the obvious fact that the larger panels present more pairs
of judges to share a co-authorship. One might suggest that some solo
authored reasons on smaller panels would have been co-authored had a
preferred colleague been present. Nevertheless, the pattern definitely does
not support any suggestion that co-authored reasons tend to be found in the
more routine cases, and offers some support for the contrary.
4. Length ofjudgment
A final surrogate for the judicial importance of a Supreme Court decision
is, I would suggest, the length of the judgment; in general, longer decisions
37. See Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-Makingin Canadian Courts ofAppeal, (Toronto:
James Lorimer & Co, 1998), c 6 especially 114ff.
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represent a greater investment of time and effort, and it makes no sense to
suggest that the Court would not be steering this investment toward those
cases, and those aspects of its jurisprudence, that it regards as the most
important. I do not deny the occasional short decision that nonetheless
carries considerable weight, or its obverse in the wordy decision that casts
no apparent shadow over future cases; but these, I would suggest, are the
unusual ones, and in general it is sensible and defensible to suggest that
other things being equal, longer decisions are more likely than shorter
ones to be significant.
The average length of a Supreme Court of Canada judgment on a
reserved decision since 1995 is just over 7,500 words (7,770 words for the
Lamer Court, 7,450 words for the McLachlin Court); and I specify 'words
in the judgment' and not 'total words in all reasons' because of the upward
skewing the latter gives to non-unanimous decisions. This being the case,
I define a 'medium' length decision as being between 5,000 and 10,000
words in length, with 'short' and 'long' lying in the obvious directions.
However, I also identify the extreme ends of the word-count tail, by having
a 'very short' category for majority judgments less than 1,000 words in
length and a 'very long' category for judgments over 15,000 words.
Length of judgment

Co-Authored
Reasons

No Co-Authored
Reasons

Total

Co-Author%

Very short

5

51

56

8.9%

Short

25

247

272

9.2%

Medium

44

389

433

10.2%

Long

30

159

189

15.9%

Very long

25

61

86

29.1%

Total

129

907

1036

12.5%

Table 10: Frequency of Co-authorship, by Length ofJudgment

The patterns connecting length of the decision with frequency of
co-authorship are shown in Table 10. There is not much difference for
the three smaller categories, bunched right around ten per cent, but for
the long and especially for the very long judgments the frequency of coauthorships goes up sharply. This again runs counter to any suggestion that
co-authorship is in general an attribute of the less significant cases, with
the more traditional solo authorship for the cases that really carry some
weight; if anything, the implication is the reverse.
Generalizing a little casually, then: co-authored reasons tend to be
found in the very long divided full-Court Charter decisions, a set that
includes many of the most important decisions of the Court. There is no
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empirically-supported reason to think of co-authorship as confined to the
less important cases.
VII. Why?
If most of the potential pairs of judges never co-author, even if they
serve on the Court together for many years, then this must be telling us
something significant about those judges who do co-author, especially
those who do so unusually often. So the obvious question is: what is it
telling us? What are the reasons for two (or more) judges to co-author, to
share the attribution of a set of reasons? I would suggest that there are two
quite different possibilities (and unfortunately there is evidence to support
both of them); the first I would call the 'similarity' thesis and the second
the 'difference' thesis.
By the 'similarity thesis' I mean the suggestion that judges co-author
because they are close allies, because they share a significant number of
legal values and priorities, and because they frequently find themselves
promoting the same sets of ideas in an attempt to persuade their colleagues
and shape the law. The examplar par excellence of the similarity thesis is
Cory and lacobucci JJ. In a previous paper on the Lamer Court," I had
occasion to consider the extent to which different pairs of judges agreed
(joined in writing or signing the same sets of reasons) on all those cases
when they served on the same panel and that panel divided on the outcome
and reasons for a specific case. The highest level of two-judge agreement
by a good margin was that between Cory and lacobucci JJ.; and just as
important, these were the two whose cohesiveness anchored the 'group of
five' that tended to dominate during the extended 'natural Court' period
that centered the Lamer decade (the other three being Lamer C.J., Major
and Sopinka JJ.). No two judges were more likely to sign on together than
Cory and lacobucci JJ.; it seems no great leap to carry that thought one step
further and say, no two judges were more likely to write together, formally
and publicly sharing the writing of the reasons supporting the outcomes
on which they so often agreed, than Cory and lacobucci JJ. This same
consideration goes some distance to resolving the problem I will revisit
below, which is the problem of working out who is really responsible for
that particular set of reasons and its subsequent impact on the law. The
more alike the two judges are on a range of values and priorities, the less
we need to make a sharp analytical distinction between them.

38. Peter McCormick, "Birds of a Feather: Alliances and Influences on the Lamer Court, 1990-97"
(1998) 36 Osgoode Hall U 339.
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This impression is reinforced by other elements of Table 4. The most
frequent co-authorship pairing is Cory plus lacobucci JJ.; the second
is lacobucci plus Sopinka JJ.; and the third is lacobucci plus Major JJ.
But all of these pairings are within the dominant five-judge group that I
noted above; all of them represent co-authorships within the set ofjudges
who voted together the most often and by doing so directed much of the
important jurisprudence of the Court. On this approach, then, voting
together shows the alliances on the Court, and writing together is a purer,
more distilled form, of these same alliances. Indeed, about 60 per cent of
the co-authorships operate within the five-judge group I have indicated
(with 20 per cent joining members of the five-judge group with the fourjudge outsiders; and 20 per cent involving Bastarache and Binnie JJ. who
joined the Court after the departure of Sopinka and La Forest JJ. Overall,
then, it would seem (at least for the Lamer Court) that like joins with like;
co-authorship is a reflection of similarity.
The 'difference thesis' is precisely the reverse: we should think of
co-authored decisions as representing some sort of difficult or reluctant
blending of two alternative views, with both authors insisting on
the inclusion of their name to indicate that they have not completely
surrendered their own viewpoint to the other. This is consistent with the
scenario presented to me by a former member of the Court, who answered
my question about the recent rise in co-authored decisions by saying that
the current Chief Justice was not comfortable with the large number of
separate concurrences on the Lamer Court, and that when there seemed to
be a possibility of one or more judges from the majority side of a divided
panel writing their own separate reasons, she strongly encouraged them
to see if they couldn't sit down together and work something out.39 This
is, as I say, the suggestion of an insider; and it does have some first-look
support in the fact that the rise of co-authorships has been accompanied by
a decline in the frequency of separate concurrences (although this last may
be rebounding in recent terms).
As to what this looks like in practice: consider LeBel and Fish JJ.,
the co-authoring pair who nose out lacobucci and Arbour JJ. for the
highest number of co-authored reasons during the McLachlin Court, as
shown in Table 6. Unlike the Cory and lacobucci JJ. pairing, which had
the highest two-judge agreement rate on the Lamer Court, the LeBel and
Fish JJ. pairing is a good notch below the all-court average rate for twojudge agreement on the McLachlin Court (taking 'agreement' as meaning
39. Private conversation with Justice Michel Bastarache; during the lRPP Senate Reform workshop
in Ottawa in October 2009.
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'signed on to the same set of reasons' rather than just 'voted for the
same outcome'). We cannot suggest for them, as we could for Cory and
lacobucci JJ., that co-authorship represents a particular strong expression
of deeply shared views on a number of important issues. Instead, there
is now something of a sense of a real difference that is accommodated
through real compromise, and almost by definition a compromise is the
middle ground that neither side can support passionately because it does
not closely approximate their ideal position.
I cannot repeat the 'within the majority bloc' calculations for the
McLachlin Court that I performed above for the Lamer Court because
there do not appear to be any persisting blocs on the McLachlin Courtinstead of a solid core that usually prevails when the Court divides, there is
a fluctuating series of majority coalitions, none of which occur more than a
handful oftimes. 40 What I am left with is simply the figures for the two-judge
pairings, and when these are compared with co-authorship frequencies,
the results are rather inconclusive. The largest numbers of co-authorships
on the McLachlin Court are between judges with only moderate (average)
agreement rates, and about one eighth of all co-authorships are between
judges with low (more than ten per cent below average) agreement rates;
but, that said, there are also a number of reasonably frequent co-authorship
pairs (lacobucci/Arbour JJ., lacobucci/Major JJ., McLachlin C.J./Charron
J.) with high agreement rates.

40. Peter McCormick, "Voting Blocks, Divided Decisions, and the McLachlin Court 2000-2009"
(paper delivered at the CPSA annual meeting, Congress of the Humanities & Social Sciences,
Montreal, Quebec, June 2010).
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Table 11: Agreement Rates on Divided Panels, McLachlin Court

Table 11 shows what fraction of the time each pair of judges agreed
(signed on to the same set of reasons) when they served together on a
non-unanimous panel; Cromwell J. has been omitted given that he joined
the Court in 2008. The range is quite striking-Major J. agreed with both
Abella and Charron JJ. three quarters of the time, but L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
agreed with Binnie J. only one quarter of the time-and the clustering of
the numbers is fairly low, in that almost one half of the pairings agreed
less than half the time that the panel divided. The table shows (by bolding)
those pairs of judges who co-authored reasons frequently, which I have
defined for this purpose as five or more times; and also (by italicizing)
those pairs of judges who never co-authored. This is summarized in Table
12, below.
Frequent

Occasional

Never

Total

70% or more

1

1

3

5

60%-69.9%

2

7

6

15

50%-59.9%

3

7

9.

19

40%-49.9%

2

10

12

24

Less than 40%

1

4

7

12

Total

9

29

37

75

Table 12: Agreement Rates & Co-Authorship Frequency
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Table 12 makes more systematically the point I have made in more
general terms above: there is no real correlation between the frequency
with which any pair of judges agreed when the panel divided, and the
likelihood that they will (or will not) have co-authored a set of reasons.
Three of the five highest (70 per cent plus) agreement rates result in no
co-authored reasons at all; one of the twelve lowest (below 40 per cent)
agreement rates generated frequent co-authorships. LeBel and Deschamps
JJ. co-authored ten times, but they sign on together substantially less than
half the time they served on the same panel; conversely, Major and Binnie
JJ. have one of the highest agreement rates on the Court (and this based on
a considerable period of service and a good number ofjoint appearances),
but they never co-authored.
Thatistosay: it would seem that both hypotheses are true simultaneously,
the one (the similarity thesis) centered on the activity of lacobucci J. and
more typical of the Lamer Court, and the other (the difference thesis)
more typical of the McLachlin Court and exemplified by LeBel and Fish
JJ. Curiously, this notion of a single phenomenon with two completely
contrary explanations does have a counterpart: specifically, in the practice
of the "By the Court" (unanimous, unattributed to any judge or judges)
decision. This practice emerged under the Dickson and Lamer Courts, and
was suggested by some41 to indicate a special style of judicial decision
that gave added weight and emphasis to major constitutional decisions.
But a closer look at the "By the Court" phenomenon generates much less
clear-cut decisions. It is quite true that the Supreme Court has used the "By
the Court" device for some of its most significant constitutional decisions
(such as the Quebec Secession Reference), but it is also true that many
"By the Court" decisions (55 of the 112 since 1984) are less than five
hundred words in length, not much more than a single printed page, and
only nineteen are longer than the average set of majority reasons. "By the
Court" reasons, then, sometimes indicate unusually important decisions,
but sometimes they indicate casually routine decisions. Similarly, coauthorships sometimes indicate persisting doctrinal linkages between
pairs of judges, and sometimes they indicate the unusual cooperation of
judges who usually differ. Such discontinuous phenomena are confusing,
hard to understand and challenging to describe, but they seem to exist.

41. See, e.g., Andre Bzdera, "A Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory
of Judicial Review" (1993) 26 Can J of Pol Sci. The same point is made by Donald Songer, The
Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An EmpiricalExamination (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2008).
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VIII. So what?
Why should all this matter? Why should anybody be concerned with this
recent and persisting practice? I think we should be concerned because
providing reasons is the most significant thing that national high courts
do, from which it follows that any significant persisting structural change
in the way that decisions are arrived at and constructed and delivered is
important to the institution and the way that it performs its (evolving)
functions.
As the Supreme Court itself has said, the giving of reasons has to do
with accountability. "Reasons for judgment are the primary mechanism
by which judges account to the parties and to the public for the decisions
they render."4 2 Lasser has identified the provision of extended, discursive,
specifically authored reasons as a critical element of common law (as
distinct from civilian) judicial processes-it is a basic principle that in
such systems judges do not vanish behind a flat, anonymous and apparently
unanimous judgment, but instead step forward to write their reasons and
sign their names. 43 Except for the unusual practice of the "By the Court"
decision (never a major element of decision delivery on our Supreme
Court, and less so today), these reasons have typically been attributed
to single judges, with other judges who disagreed or did not quite agree
writing their own reasons to say why. Although the other judges 'behind'
the writers, in either the majority or minority bloc, undoubtedly had some
say (perhaps even some negotiated say) in the precise wording," the
spotlight was distinctly on the lead author. By extension, when we talk
about a judge's record on the bench, or when we assess what that judge
contributed to the evolution of the law in general or with respect to specific
legal issues, we do so by identifying and studying and quoting from the
decisions and the reasons for which that judge assumed the primary
responsibility. Co-authorship blurs this attribution-less so perhaps under
the 'similarity thesis' than under the 'difference thesis,' but it still blurs
it. In the future, if we study the contributions of LeBel or Fish JJ., we
will have to carry a parallel analysis of 'LeBel and Fish' and what this
'not quite one or the other' shadow justice can teach us. This may be a
manageable problem when only ten per cent of the judgments, and ten
per cent of the minority reasons, present the face of co-authorship; if the
number continues to increase, we will need to address it more directly.
42.

R v Sheppard,2002 SCC 26 at para 15, [2002] 1 SCR 869, Binnie J.

43.

Mitchel de s.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Transparency

and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press, 2009).
44. For an American discussion of this phenomenon, see Forrest Maltzmann et al, Crafting Law on
the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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To make the point by way of a colourful metaphor: let us think of the
reasoned contributions of all the individuals who ever serve on a particular
Court as being assigned their own primary colour as we locate them in
some circular (or three-dimensional global) arrangement, these discs of
colour having a variety of shadings of secondary colours along specific
edges to reflect the influence of their various colleagues. (To be sure, there
are not enough primary colours for this to work literally, but let us pretend
there are.) Co-authorship, especially regular co-authorship extending to a
number of significant judgments, implies an overlap of the discs, creating
not just a shaded edge but a zone of not inconsiderable proportion in which
we no longer have a primary colour, only a secondary colour. This is not
necessarily a bad thing; my point is that it is a different thing.
Henderson suggests that changes to the way the Court organizes and
presents itself in the delivery of reasons do not 'just happen' but rather
reflect a changing social, legal and political context within which the
Court is trying to perform an evolving function 4 5-the decision delivery
form 'makes sense' (and the new one 'makes more sense' than the old one)
once we decode this story. Similarly, a note in the most recent Harvard
Law Review, speaking of the emergence of the practice of explicitly
'respectful' dissents, observes that "there exists a demonstrable nexus
between institutional practice...and institutional purpose."4 6 Perhaps what
we are seeing is a step away from, if you will, a 'star system' in which
specific judges 'stand for' specific trends or issues in the law, each taking
a turn in the spotlight on the appropriate occasions. 47 Co-authorship, on
the other hand, points toward a more collegial product in which judges
collaborate more extensively and formally, something that is perhaps
reinforced by the current Court's tendency for shifting alliances rather
than solid blocs. But Henderson's warning is well taken-we should never
think of such things as if they 'just happened' for no particular reason,
or as simply reducible to individual personalities and idiosyncrasies, as
if the presentation of its reasons is not something upon which the Court
seriously reflects as a critical element of its product.
It is intriguing that the rise of co-authorship has recently been explored
in other contexts; for example, Ginsburg and Miles have pointed out that

45. M Todd Henderson, "From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent" (2007)
1 Sup Ct Rev 283.
46. Note, "From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the 'Respectful' Consent" (2011) 124
Harv L Rev 1305.
47. 1admit that I have tended toward this sort of description myself, thinking of Sopinka J as the 'fair
answer and defence guy,' or Lamer CJ as championing the right to be represented, or L'Heureux-Dub6
J as relentlessly promoting anti-discrimination as the true core and focus of s 15 equality rights.
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research in the field of empirical legal theory is increasingly manifested
in co-authored rather than single-authored publications.4 8 None of the
four motives they suggest for increasing co-authorships (specialist
complementarity; compensation; enhanced quality and credibility; and
diversification) seem directly applicable here, although on the negative
side, their "diminution of credit" idea is somewhat similar to the point I
am making. For present purposes, it is significant that they assume that
the explanation has to be sought in the changing nature of the academic
legal profession itself, including the "increasingly technical demands
in scholarship" and the "increasingly sophisticated methodologies" of
empirical and interdisciplinary work.
Conclusion
John Orth once wrote an article4 9 (and then reused the title for the book
that collected several articles"o) entitled "How Many Judges Does it Take
to Make a Supreme Court?" (referring to the US Supreme Court) and then
proceeded to explain why the obvious answer "nine" is not completely
satisfactory. Similarly, I am asking "how many judges does it take to write
a Supreme Court decision?" and pointing out the fact that the obvious
answer "one" does not cover as much ground as one might have thought.
But where his concerns are largely historic, mine are more contemporary.
My. topic might appear slightly esoteric: like the young child at
Christmas, I want to play with the pretty wrapping while the adults
focus on what was inside. But the decision/delivery duality is not really
as easily divided as the product/packaging duality. "The medium is the
message" may pitch it a bit strong, but it reminds us that the message
and the medium are a meaning-communication package that cannot be
disaggregated without changing it. How the Court is telling us something
is not unconnected from what it is telling us, and changes in how it tells
us things have their own dynamic and their own significance. What I have
done is to draw attention to a recent phenomenon on the Court-the coauthorship of reasons, both judgments and minority reasons-and shown
that it is at least a persisting and possibly a growing part of the way that
the Court delivers its reasons. But although I have shown that it exists,
48. Tom Ginsburg & Thomas J Miles, "Empiricism and the Rising Incidence of Coauthorship in
Law" U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No 545 (15 February 2011), online:
Social Science Research Network <papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1762323>. Note
that the paper itself is coauthored.
49. John V Orth, "How Many Judges Does It Take to Make a Supreme Court?" (2002) 19 Const
Commentary 681.
50. John V Orth, How Many Judges Does It Take to Make a Supreme Court? And Other Essays on
Law and the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).
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and that it applies to a set of cases that is skewed toward the Court's more
important decisions, I am left with two completely contradictory, even
mutually exclusive, explanations of why it is happening and what it means.
This being the case, it is clear that more research needs to be done on this
question, with this paper hopefully serving as a useful prolegomenon.

